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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Due to its broadness, it fails to provide certainty in the deter-
mination of whether particular incidents are "accidental." How-
ever, it is submitted that a general test is the only practical one
that could be adopted in view of the variety and complexity of
factual situations which arise in this branch of the law.
Charley Quienalty
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER
CIVILIAN MILITARY DEPENDENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Defendant, a civilian, was tried and convicted for the murder
of her Air Force husband by a general court-martial.' The mili-
tary court predicated its jurisdiction upon Article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2 and an executive agreement
between England and the United States. The conviction was af-
firmed by the Air Force Board of Review, but reversed by the
Court of Military Appeals, because of prejudicial errors concern-
ing the defense of insanity. After she was transferred to this
country, and while awaiting a proposed retrial by court-martial,
the defendant petitioned a federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus to release her on the ground that the Constitution
did not permit her trial by military authorities. The district
court granted the writ and ordered her released. The govern-
ment appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court,
which reversed the district court. On rehearing, the decision of
the district court was held, affirmed. Justice Black, in an opinion
in which three Justices joined, held that criminal action by the
United States against a service man's overseas civilian depend-
1. Of course, jury trial is not within the scheme of courts-martial. Instead,
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 16, c. 169, 64 STAT. 113 (1950), 10
U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V, 1958) provides that: "The three kinds of courts-martial
in each of the armed forces are- (1) general courts-martial, consisting of a law
officer and not less than five members; (2) special courts-martial, consisting of
not less than three members; and (3) summary courts-martial, consisting of one
commissioned officer."
2. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(11), c. 169, 64 STAT. 109 (1950),
10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (Supp. V, 1958) : "The following persons are subject to this
chapter:
"(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may
be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, em-
ployed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States."
3. 57 STAT. 1193, E.A.S. No. 355 (July 27, 1942). The appropriate forum for
trying an accused dependent in England, as well as the other North Atlantic Treaty
Nations, is provided for in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 4 U.S. U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, June 19, 1951 (effective August 23, 1953).
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ent in time of peace must be in accordance with the constitutional
limitations of grand jury indictment and jury trial. Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan, in separate opinions, concurred in the
results, but upon very narrow grounds. They felt that Article
2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was unconstitu-
tional insofar as it gives military courts jurisdiction to try civil-
ian dependents for capital crimes in time of peace. Justice Clark,
joined by Justice Burton, dissented, considering Article 2 (11) as
necessary to the power of Congress to provide for the govern-
ment of the land and naval forces. 4 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957) .5
The Constitution requires that the federal government afford
a citizen accused of crime a grand jury indictment and a trial by
a jury of his peers.6 The Constitution dispenses with the require-
ment of grand jury indictment in "cases arising in the land and
naval forces. '' 7 Congressional power to regulate the armed forces
includes the power to provide for trial without jury.8 A diffi-
cult problem, however, is that of determining what persons are
subject to military justice. Article 32 of the American Articles
of War of 1775 provided that: "All suttlers and retailers9 [sic]
4. Justice Whittaker did not take part.
5. United States ex rel. Krueger v. Kinsella, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), was a com-
panion case to Reid v. Covert. In the former case, Mrs. Smith was tried and con-
victed by general court-martial for the murder of her husband, an army colonel.
The jurisdiction of the military court was purportedly based upon Article 2(11)
of the UCMJ and a treaty between the United States and Japan, 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492, February 28, 1952 (effective April 28, 1952). Upon ap-
proval of the conviction by the Army Board of Review and the Court of Military
Appeals, she was confined in a federal penitentiary in West Virginia. The defend-
ant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, but the district court refused to issue
the writ. United States ex rel. Krueger v. Kinsella, 137 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. W. Va.
1956). While the appeal was pending in the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. On first hearing, the Court affirmed the lower court. Kinsella
v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956). But on rehearing, the district court was re-
versed. Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI.
7. Id. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger; . .. ."
Id. art. III, § 2: "The Trial of all crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; ,but when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."
Id. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed .. "
8. In re Waidman, 42 F.2d 239, 240-41 (D. Me. 1930) ; E parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 43 (1942) (dictum) ; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137-38
(1866) (concurring opinion) (dictum).
9. Article 32 was copied verbatim from the English Article of War of 1765,
except for the word "retailer." This is apparently due to oversight, for it was
corrected in the first revision to appear as "retainers."
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to the camp, and all persons whatsoever, serving with the conti-
nental army in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are subject
to the articles, rules, and regulations of the continental army." 10
It was felt that since these persons were protected by the army,
they owed to the army a duty of obedience.' Some retainers to
the camp, such as telegraph operators and newspaper correspond-
ents, were tried by courts-martial, but more often they were
denied rations or summarily expelled from the camp. 2 Soldiers'
wives came under the definition of "retainers," but there were
only isolated instances of their being subjected to military jus-
tice.- 8 The term "in the field" was not restricted to a period of
war, in the technical sense, but it appears that it connoted an
area where by the nature of the military position, and the ab-
sence of civil authority, military control over the whole camp was
appropriate. 14 Shortly after the Civil War, the United States Su-
preme Court, in the case of Ex parte Milligan,"' held that a civil-
ian could not be subjected to court-martial so long as civil courts
in the area were open. Following this decision, it was felt that
military jurisdiction over civilians would be appropriate only in
time of war in theaters of war.6 It has been thought by some
that the above restriction on military jurisdiction was limited in
its scope of applicability to cases arising within the continental
United States, since there was then no notion of United States
troops going abroad." Following the American intervention in
Cuba in 1906-07, it was seen that provision should be made for
jurisdiction over dependents following American troops outside
the country. The Articles of War were revised in 1916, and juris-
diction was granted the military over dependents who accom-
panied the armed forces outside the country." Subsequent re-
visions and codifications made no substantial change in the 1916
provision. 9
The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the constitu-
10. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 956 (2d ed. 1920).
11. Id. at 98.
12. Id. at 98-99.
13. Id. at 99.
14. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). See,
in general, BLUMENTHAL, WOMEN CAMP FOLLOWERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION (1952). Contra, WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 101 (2d ed.
1920).
15. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
16. See Supplemental Brief for the Government, p. 41-42, Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957).
17. Id. at 42.
18. 39 STAT. 651 (1916).
19. See note 2 supra, for statute in its present form.
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tionality of military jurisdiction over dependents overseas in
time of peace prior to the instant case. However, the Court has
decided cases involving similar denials of the rights of grand
jury indictment and jury trial by non-military courts created by
Congress to try offenses arising outside the continental bound-
aries of the United States. In the case of In re Ross,20 the defend-
ant, an American seaman in Japan, was tried and convicted of
murder by a "consular court,"' 21 a court which had been created
by Congress pursuant to a treaty with Japan. Here procedure
provided for neither grand jury indictment nor trial by jury, but
the Supreme Court held this to be inconsequential. The Court de-
clared, without qualification, that those constitutional guarantees
did not extend beyond the United States boundaries. In the In-
sular cases, 22 the Court upheld Congress' refusal to provide grand
jury indictment and jury trial in territorial possessions. 28 There
it was considered inexpedient to require grand jury indictment
and jury trial in areas unfamiliar with the American system of
justice.
On the first hearing of the instant case, 24 the Court relied
heavily on the In re Ross and the Insular cases in reversing the
district court's decision to release the defendant. These cases
were cited as authority for the Court's holding that Congress'
power to create legislative courts in areas where there were no
federal courts included the power to provide for trial by court-
martial, since the latter was "reasonable and consonant with due
process." But on second hearing, Justice Black, writing an opin-
ion in which three Justices joined, felt that the previous reliance
on the Ross and Insular cases was misplaced. "At best," Justice
Black stated, "the Ross case should be left as a relic from a dif-
20. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
21. The consular court was a particular legislative court. The American consul
in Japan was given authority to try offenses committed by Americans in that coun-
try by treaties of 1857, 11 STAT. 723, and 1858, 12 STAT. 1051, art. VI. The 1858
treaty with Japan was ratified in 1860, and in the same year Congress passed the
act to carry this treaty into effect. Ra.v. STAT. §§ 4083-4091 (1878). Pursuant to
Section 4106, it was required that at least four American citizens of good repute
be chosen by lot to assist the consul in judging capital cases. If the decision was
not unanimous, the case was referred to the commissioner for his adjudication,
either by entering judgment in the case, or remitting the case to the consul with in-
structions. The Congress has recently abolished the consular system of courts.
70 STAT. 773 (1956).
22. E.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ; Door v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904) ; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) ; Downes v. Bid-
well, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, grants Congress power to make rules and regula-
tions for United States Territories.
24. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
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ferent era, '25 and "neither the [Insular] cases nor their reason-
ing should be given further expansion. '26 Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan agreed, in their concurring opinions, that the cases
were not authority for denying grand jury indictment and
jury trials in capital cases in military proceedings. However,
both Justices defended the cases as practical solutions in their
historical settings. Another great diversity of views in the sec-
ond hearing centered around the interpretation of the congres-
sional power to regulate the armed forces. Justice Black felt that
this power must be restricted to those in uniform. 27 Neither did
Justice Black think that the "necessary and proper" clause 28
could be used as a device for extending military jurisdiction over
civilian wives and dependents in time of peace.29 In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Harlan declared that the choice of military
or civilian trials depended upon the particular circumstances of
each case, and refused to go farther than to state that jury trial
must be provided civilian dependents overseas in capital cases.
Justice Frankfurter confined his opinion strictly to the capital
offense which was before the Court, but did state that in future
problems of this sort, the test should be whether the court-
martial jurisdiction is so necessary for the governing of the
armed forces that the accused must suffer the loss of grand jury
indictment and jury trial.80
Apparently the only conclusion upon which a majority of the
25. 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957).
26. Id. at 14.
27. Quoting Colonel Winthrop, Justice Black stated: "A statute cannot be
framed by which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the military juris-
diction in time of peace." Id. at 35.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. "Having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the
Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of Clause 14." Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957). Justice Black did not think it had 'been the his-
torical practice under Clause 14 to subject dependents to military jurisdiction in
time of peace. Justice Frankfurter, viewing the history of Clause 14, stated:
"What has been urged on us falls far too short of proving a well established prac-
tice- to be deemed to be infused into the Constitution-of court-martial juris-
diction, certainly not in capital cases, over such civilians in time of peace." Id. at
64. To the contrary, Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, stated: "[T]he
historical evidence presented by the Government convinces me that, at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, military jurisdiction was not thought to be
rigidly limited to uniformed personnel. The fact is that it was traditional for 're-
tainers to the camp' to be subjected to military discipline, that civilian dependents
encamped with the armies were traditionally regarded as being in that class, and
that the concept was not strictly limited to times of war." Id. at 71.
30. The approaches taken by Justices Frankfurter and Ilarlan are typical of
the Court's "due process" cases. In fact Justice Harlan stated: "I do not concede
that whatever process is 'due' an offender faced with a fine or a prison sentence
necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a capital case." Id.
at 77.
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Justices in the instant case could agree is that overseas depend-
ents of military personnel cannot be subjected to court-martial
for capital offenses in time of peace. Still remaining unsettled is
the question of the proper forum to try non-capital offenses com-
mitted by dependents,3 1 and all offenses committed by civilian
employees attached to the military.3 2 If the military court on the
overseas installation is powerless to try such cases, a practical
problem of just where to try them results. 3 As a solution, Con-
gress might create special courts within the United States to try
these alleged offenders, since Article III, Section 2, of the Con-
stitution authorizes the establishment of such courts. 34 However,
there is no federal common law of crimes" and thus such courts
would have no substantive law to apply, unless a substantive
criminal code were adopted. Further, witnesses to the alleged
crime could not be compelled to journey to this country to testify,
and there would be difficulty obtaining documents abroad in the
absence of compulsory process. A further possibility might be
the establishment of courts providing full constitutional guaran-
tees in the host countries, instead of in the United States, but it
is doubtful that many foreign states would acquiesce to such a
plan, since it would amount to a complete deprivation of their
right to try persons for crimes committed within their territory.
By conventions, the United States has been granted the right to
establish courts-martial within the receiving states, but this is
31. The conclusion to be gleaned from Justice Black's opinion is that no civilian
dependent is amenable to military law for any offense. Justice Frankfurter re-
stricted his opinion solely to the capital case at bar, while Justice Harlan concluded
that there might be a difference in what was "due" an alleged capital and non-
capital offender. Justice Clark, dissenting, could find no distinction in the Con-
stitution between capital and other cases.
32. A federal district court for the District of Columbia has subsequently held
that a civilian employee, charged with larceny, and conspiracy to commit larceny,
is subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Reid v. Covert was distinguished. United
States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1958). Justice
Black recognized that "there might be circumstances where a person could be 'in'
the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been
inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
23 (1957).
33. If Justice Black's opinion is given its full meaning (civil trial for any of-
fense committed by a civilian dependent), a serious problem is created because of
the large number of persons affected. "Reliable figures show that our Armed
Forces overseas are accompanied by approximately a quarter of a million dependents
and civilian workers. Figures relating to the Army alone show that in the 6 fiscal
years from July 1, 1949, to June 30, 1955, a total of 2,280 civilians were tried by
courts-martial. While it is true that the vast majority of these prosecutions were
for minor offenses, the volume alone shows the serious problem that would be
presented by the administration of a dual system of courts." Kinsella v. Krueger,
351 U.S. 470, 477, n. 7 (1956).
34. See note 7 8upra.
35. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241 (1943) ; United States v.
Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947).
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altogether different from their permitting the operation of a
complete American judicial process on their sovereign soil. 36 It
would be possible to surrender the offender to the host country
for trial, but his offense might not be considered criminal in the
host country. If the host country had notions of justice contrary
to those of the United States, a release of the accused to it for
trial might encounter "due process" difficulties.8 7 It is evident,
then, that the instant case in effect has furnished a challenge to
both Congress and the Executive to find some manner of trying
the offenses of civilians connected with the military overseas.
A. Clayton James, Jr.
CONTRACTS - LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING, ZONING
ORDINANCE AS GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF OPTION
Plaintiff agency brought suit to recover a sum paid for an
option to purchase a certain city lot. The neighborhood in which
the property was located was apparently industrial. The lot it-
self contained a filling station and across the street was an iron
works establishment. At the time the option was purchased
plaintiff intended a particular commercial use for the property
which was in keeping with the appearance of the neighborhood,
but later learned that this use was prohibited by a zoning ordi-
nance.1 The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal,
held, reversed. In view of the character of the neighborhood and
the fact that the vendor was aware of the use to which the plain-
36. The receiving state has retained its primary right to try offenses committed
against its nationals by United States servicemen and their dependents. See 4
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792, art. IV, para. 3(b), T.I.A.S. No. 2846, June 19, 1951 (effec-
tive August 23, 1953). To say the least, it would be a considerable strain upon na-
tional pride to allow American judges, lawyers, and juries the power to function on
foreign soil. Moreover, provision would have to be made for a criminal code, and
it would not be possible to issue compulsory process against witnesses and docu-
ments. The difficult task of impaneling a jury would be ever present. If it were
composed of foreign nationals, this would be little better than releasing the ac-
cused to the host country for prosecution. If civilian dependents compose the jury,
might not the possibility of "command influence" be as prevalent as in courts-
martial? See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957).
37. "In Saudi Arabia the King has absolute power of life or death over the
people. If an American soldier were 'tried' in that country, it would be doubtful
that a treaty authorizing the application of those standards of justice would find
favor with an American. . . . In view of the fact that Article 12 of the French
Code Penal requires the use of the guillotine, it is interesting to speculate as to
whether that instrument would meet due process requirements." Note, 18 LouISI-
ANA LAW Raviw 173, n. 20 (1957).
1. The area was zoned as "industrial non-conforming." The building could not
be substantially changed for commercial purposes and after six months non-use
would become a location for residential structures only.
